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As Professor Beer stated at the beginning of this symposium, the 1947
Constitution is no longer an experimental document. Not only has it attained
the status of one of the oldest existing constitutions, but it is also clear that it
forms an integral part of Japanese society. Its origins may have been foreign,
but its contemporary function and content is now thoroughly Japanese. And
just as Japan's economic and social success has begun to attract attention and
admiration from the West, so should its legal system and, perhaps most
especially, its constitutional law.
In this context, it would be hard to think of three better papers to lay out
the state of Japanese constitutional jurisprudence than those of Professors
George, Tomatsu, and Beer.' In this regard, Professor George deserves
special thanks from the Americans among us. His paper not only gives us a
straightforward recitation of the constitutional procedures governing perhaps
the world's most celebrated police; it also lays out the statutory and
constitutional framework with such encyclopedic thoroughness that its
usefulness for reference will rival its analytic power. My sole criticism is that I
tend to lean more heavily than does Professor George in the direction of
questioning the relationship between the principle (tatemae), or the way
things should be or are expected to be, of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
and the reality (honne)2 of actual police practices. Police practices in
interrogation and investigation are not always in accord with the spirit if not
the letter of the legal rules. It remains true, nonetheless, that the
accomplishment of an extraordinarily safe society without recourse to tyranny
or widespread police brutality is a remarkable achievement, and the
comments in Professor George's paper to this effect are well taken.
Professor Tomatsu's treatment of equal protection doctrine demonstrates
the maturity and complexity of Japanese law in this area. I was struck by the
Supreme Court justices' willingness to address the malapportionment issue
despite the convenient avoidance devices available to them. First, of course,
they could have used the political question doctrine that they arguably have
used in the Article 9 litigation challenging the Self-Defense Forces and the
U.S.-Japan military alliance. Second, they could have decided that the Public
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Election Law did not provide a statutory vehicle for attacking constitutional
issues. Instead of taking either of these plausible routes-especially plausible
for a supposedly conservative court-the justices accepted the question as
justiciable and, in at least two instances, determined that the apportionment
was unconstitutional. After refusing to avoid the issue, however, the justices
were faced with doing something about the unconstitutionality of the
apportionment. Here, they became the "yes, but" court: Yes the
apportionment is unconstitutional, but we do not choose to do anything about
it. This course of action raises the question ofjudicial capacity and relevance.
It would be interesting to analyze the connection between these decisions and
the redistricting that has taken place over the years. Has the court played a
role and, if so, what has been its nature?
Another issue raised by Professor Tomatsu is the nature of the public-
private distinction within Japanese law. His treatment of the discrimination
cases brings out an aspect of Japanese constitutional law that I have often
wondered about: When does the Constitution apply, albeit indirectly, to
private behavior and when does it not? As Professor Tomatsu demonstrates,
by using Articles 1 and 90 of the Civil Code, the courts have readily applied
constitutional norms of behavior to gender discrimination in post-hiring
employment relations. The Court seemed to refuse to apply such norms to
discrimination based on political belief, however, in the Mitsubishi Jcishi
case. 3 The question of what American lawyers would call "state action" did
not play the determining role in either circumstance, however. Given the
importance of the public-private distinction in Japanese jurisprudence, I
wonder why the courts apparently have been able to collapse the distinction in
some circumstances without attracting more attention politically and
academically.
The courts' apparent willingness to dissolve the public-private distinction
in these two circumstances reminds me of the question raised by Professor
Beer's superb article on freedom of expression: what he calls "individualistic
groupism" and the occasional tyranny of group expression in Japan. I was
once again impressed by Professor Beer's ability to draw new and interesting
lessons from his ongoing study of Japanese Supreme Court doctrines and the
social and political context in which they function. As his work points out,
one cannot look only at "public" restrictions in Japan if one wants to
understand how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression works
in practice in Japan. One must, instead, look at both the public and private
dimensions and somehow break down the distinction, which, despite its
power in Japanese academic jurisprudence, may be a Western idea that has
never grown deep roots in Japan.
Professor Beer indicates that the reporters' clubs are probably a more
direct challenge and impediment to certain types of journalism in Japan than
is any conceivable government censorship. A similar phenomenon in another
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area is the use of "denunciation struggle" by the Buraku Liberation League 4
to attack perceived discrimination. The threat of being "denounced" has
effectively meant that academic commentators and the many organs of the
mass media avoid the diwa problem almost entirely. 5 The result is an
informal taboo on discussion of the topic, a taboo so pervasive that, outside
areas of large Buraku population, many Japanese are barely aware that the
problem of discrimination against Burakumin still exists. Yet our
constitutional jurisprudence has no established way to deal with such
pervasive but "private" restrictions except to dismiss them as no concern of
the law. Fortunately, Professor Beer's development of concepts like
"individualistic groupism" and the "ecology of freedom of expression" within
the Japanese social and political context may help us attack such issues and
phenomena not only in Japanese but also in American constitutional law.
4. Burakumin are descendants of persons classified as nonhuman, or not belonging to human
society, during the Tokugawa period (approximately 1600 to 1868). Although all legal classifications
of Burakumin were eliminated shortly after the Meiji restoration, social discrimination continues.
5. Diwa is usually translated as "harmony" or "assimilation." It is a euphemism for matters
concerning Burakumin. Thus, "d6wa administration" or the "diwa problem" refers to government
measures taken on behalf of Burakumin or the Burakumin problem.
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